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EXHIBIT 5-b

by the deliberative process privilege?

And I realize that question invokes the issue whether or not and under what circumstances the deliberative process privilege could be waived, but let's--

MR. NEALON: So, something that would--

THE COURT: Let's just take the two privileges together. What in this case would be covered by the attorney/client privilege and not also covered by the deliberative process privilege?

MR. NEALON: Well, I think the deliberative process privilege— I mean, let's assume that you had someone like a Mr. Whealan, who, according to his own PowerPoints and his presentations, was a material player in terms of coming up with these rules. I suppose he could have internal discussions about the various considerations, you know, that are going into these rules, different factual things that the PTO is considering, different alternatives that they looked at, that he could have discussions within the PTO, that one might arguably be able to claim is attorney/client privilege. And then he go goes out to a town hall meeting, you know, and talks about that at length.

I think you could have a situation where that would be waived from an attorney/client point of view. Now the question is, why wouldn't that be waived from a deliberative process point of view? Or why would the deliberative process

22 privilege be waived from that point? 1 2 THE COURT: Take it either way. 3 MR. NEALON: Well, I think once it's out there, it's 4 no longer confidential. And I think that that would obviate both privileges, you know, just from a privilege law point of 5 6 view. 7 But the deliberative process privilege is a very 8 narrow privilege, and there is case law that we cited saying 9 it should be narrowly construed. And it has very technical 10 elements. You know, one of which is, is the actual communication, let's say, in any given document, something 11 12 that if it was disclosed, you know, would hinder frank 13 discussion in the future among government officials. 14 So, I think it's a different requirement. You know, 15 I think I could certainly foresee there being discussions internally, you know, let's say right before the rules-- I 16 17 don't know, let's say there is a transcript made among some of 18 the key decision makers, okay, we have to decide tomorrow 19 whether we are actually going to go with these rules, let's 20 debate all the pros and cons that we have been talking about 21 for the last 24 or 36 months. 22 I mean, that piece of it may be deliberative 23 depending upon what's in the document, but I do not think it would be necessarily be deliberative if every discussion 24 25 relating to the topic for the last 36 months before that and

all the evidence that may have been considered— And that's our concern, that there are, I would assume, legitimate areas of deliberative process privilege here, you know, that could be asserted. And someone has to stand up and say, I am willing to certify that this is an appropriate invocation of the privilege. And you have the factual material that was considered because, obviously, it is well known you can't hide facts, you know, within the privilege.

So, if there were factual considerations considered by the PTO, we are entitled to know what those are.

And I guess that's kind of a roundabout way of discussing it, but I think that once it is disclosed in the public domain, a particular communication, that that would obviate the deliberative process privilege as well.

THE COURT: All right. Before I hear from the other attorneys, are there any other points that you wanted to cover? Because I have kept you engaged.

And specifically, is there any additional gloss that you wanted to put on your submissions with respect to the depositions you wanted to take?

MR. NEALON: Well, just a couple of points. Again, I mentioned the point that there is Fourth Circuit authority saying that we can use discovery to complete the administrative record. And that is our intent here.

I think, you know, to some extent we cite cases

dealing with bad faith and we think we have shown indicia of bad faith warranting further investigation. And this presumption of regularity shouldn't be used as a shield to prevent us from probing into that.

One of the cases cited by the PTO is this <u>Amfac</u> case that talks about we are entitled to all materials that might have influenced the agency's decision. And they go on to say, and not merely those which the agency relied on in its final decision.

Here the PTO has said, look, we have determined that the only thing you are really entitled to in terms of an administrative record is what we considered in the final decision. And no one is quite sure when that happened. But that rationale seems to be directly contrary to one of their own cases.

THE COURT: And I am going to hear Ms. Wetzler on that.

MR. NEALON: So, again, the standard is very broad. The deliberative process privilege is very narrow and fact specific. It is the PTO's burden, if they want to claim a privilege once challenged, I think to assert that.

I think that there is an attorney/client privilege again that can certainly be asserted, but our concern is really, do we have a cherry-picked record or do we have the real record.

And going back to a point Your Honor made, why shouldn't we just go to Judge Cacheris and ask that this whole thing be remanded. It seems to me there is the more direct route through the discovery process in terms of making sure we have a complete administrative record, giving the parties an opportunity to challenge if they are so inclined any assertions of privilege. To get some sense as to what the scope of it is. I mean, certainly there is a big difference if we are talking about 50 documents that are being withheld as privileged as opposed to 20,000 documents. Because if there is 20,000 documents, you know, I think that raises concerns, what was the criteria for selecting it.

And again, just fundamentally, at the end of the day the Court has to review the whole record. And we can certainly come in at the end of the day and say, well, there is really not much in the record from which we could reverse engineer these rules, so we should throw it out. But we should be entitled to go one step further and say, if there is matter that should have been included in the record that would have been adverse to what the PTO wanted to do, we are entitled to know what that is and to present that to the Court as an arbitrary and capricious ground and/or as evidence of bad faith.

And it gets sort of circular. It's like, well, you have to prove bad faith to be able to pursue bad faith. We

26 think we have put out enough evidence, at least initial 1 2 indicia of it, to make a prima facie case that there has been some bad faith sufficient to warrant some further 3 investigation. 4 5 So, I think whether we go the route Your Honor 6 mentioned, which is going back to Judge Cacheris to try to get 7 the record supplemented, or whether there is a document discovery ordered and a privilege log produced, I think at the 8 9 end of the day the result is the same. Hopefully we have a full administrative record and the parties can make whatever 10 arguments they want to make. But we have to be permitted to 11 12 challenge whether that is a proper record because otherwise 13 there is no way to prove ultimately our bad faith claim, 14 particularly on the RFA certification. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. 16 MR. NEALON: Okay, thank you. THE COURT: Mr. Desmarais. 17 18 MR. DESMARAIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 I think my focus is a little bit different from 20 Tafas, so let me, we are not trying to get depositions and we are not pursuing the bad faith argument. Our argument is 21 22 actually very focused and our requests very narrow. 23 I think it is undisputed between all the parties 24 that to make this determination, the Court needs the record, 25 the whole record. The cases are unanimous in that. There is

no contrary authority.

THE COURT: And Ms. Wetzler says the Court has the whole record as she interprets that term.

MR. DESMARAIS: Exactly. And that's exactly what I wanted to focus on. I think that while the PTO is taking the position that they have provided the whole record, when you actually drill down and look at what they provided, what they said in the declaration and what they didn't provide, it is clear that they have not.

And just to get very specific about it, and we have outlined this in our brief, the first category of documents we outlined in our brief that are clearly not in the record as provided by the Patent Office, where are the documents before January 2006?

These rules were a sea change at the Patent Office, a sea change for patent practitioners. They had very specific proposals in them about the number of claims you could file, the number of continuations you can file, the searching requirements. These weren't made up out of whole cloth. And we outlined this in our brief.

So, what is missing? The analysis that the Patent
Office did to come up with the limits for how many
continuations you could file, how many requests for
continuation, the specifics about how you are going to do this
searching. They did analyses, they did models, they did

28 models about if we adopt these rules, what is the effect going 1 2 to be on the backlog of the patent applications pending in the Patent Office? 3 We know they did this. They have told us they did 4 5 this. These models and rules and analyses are not in the 6 record. THE COURT: Why do you need to have them? MR. DESMARAIS: Here I can--8 THE COURT: This is the analog of the question I 9 10 kept asking Mr. Nealon. 11 MR. DESMARAIS: Right. 12 THE COURT: Why do you need to have them in order to be able to make the argument that you are going to make to the 13 14 District Judge on summary judgment? 15 MR. DESMARAIS: Here's why. This type of document, 16 and there are other reasons for the other documents, but on 17 this type of documents, they go directly to the claim of 18 whether the rules as adopted are arbitrary and capricious. 19 Because one of the things we get to pursue in making a claim of whether it is arbitrary and capricious is what were 20 the alternatives? Were there alternatives less burdensome? 21 And the burden is on the folks subject to the rule. 22 23 So, for instance, we know that the PTO considered limiting it to five claims, limiting it to ten claims, 24 limiting it to six claims. And they did analyses and models 25

29 on all those different options, but then only chose one--1 2 THE COURT: Well, you may have a multistep process. But why isn't the appropriate course -- Let's assume the 3 4 correctness of your arguments. Why isn't the appropriate course to get the matter 5 6 remanded to the agency with a requirement that they supplement 7 the administrative record, and then on a properly supplemented record make your demonstration to the District Judge that the 8 9 decision was in fact arbitrary and capricious? I mean, it seems --10 11 MR. DESMARAIS: I think that is--12 THE COURT: -- to me that taken together, that's the 13 course that the precedents normally require. 14 MR. DESMARAIS: You are 100 percent right. There is 15 clearly case law support that one avenue is to go to the District Judge and ask for the case to be remanded to have the 16 17 record augmented fully. No question about it, Your Honor, you 18 are 100 percent right. 19 However, there is also--THE COURT: And these, and these plaintiffs, I want 20 to get this out and then I am going to be quiet and let you 21 respond, these plaintiffs, like many others in the 22 administrative review arena, want the Court to make an 23 24 exception to that rule, you know, we are different from all

other disputants, and the Court in our case should make an

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exception and allow extensive, you-all are asking for,
discovery before summary judgment so that we don't have to do
what other plaintiffs have to do because that's the way
Congress wrote the law.

MR. DESMARAIS: I think I would respond to that in this way. Firstly, I think it's, we need to separate the plaintiffs because GSK is not asking for extensive discovery. And I will go into that in a moment on what actually we are asking for. It's the Tafas plaintiffs who are asking for the depositions and the bad faith discovery.

GSK is not. We are asking for very targeted discovery to get at these analyses and studies and models that is we know that the Patent Office did that they have said they have done.

So, you know, are we asking for broad discovery?

GSK is not. We want the Court to order document requests which we have drafted and attached which go specifically to the things we know are missing from the record. And we have drafted a few interrogatories that we have attached to our brief specifically saying, tell us about what models and analyses you did because we know they did them and they are not in the record.

So, we are not asking for broad discovery. And that's how I distinguish the cases. Because Your Honor is 100 percent right, when there are glaring errors in the